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Abstract
We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by
Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently dis-
tributed. We focus on general joint distributions, seeking the optimal deterministic incentive
compatible auction. We give a geometric characterization of the optimal auction, resulting in a
duality theorem and an efficient algorithm for finding the optimal deterministic auction in the
two-bidder case and an NP-completeness result for three or more bidders.
1 Introduction
Myerson’s paper [21] on optimal auction design is remarkable in several ways. It is not the
first important paper on auctions of course [30], but it pioneers the point of view of its title:
auction design, that is, the exploration and evaluation of a large design space in a mindset that
is very much one of computer science. It is elegant and methodologically original and powerful,
completely resolving this important and difficult problem and providing insights, lemmata, and
methodology that would be useful in related contexts for decades. Myerson considers the auction
of an item to bidders with private valuations whose prior distributions are independent and
known, and seeks incentive compatible mechanisms that maximize auctioneer revenue. His
simple and elegant solution involves the virtual valuation, a quantity each bidder can compute
from their private valuation and the valuation distribution through a mathematical maneuver
called ironing.
Myerson leaves open the case in which the valuations are correlated; in subsequent work,
Cre´mer and McLean [8, 7] consider correlated valuations and solve the problem for the case
where auctions are only required to be interim individually rational. In fact, in this framework
the uncorrelated case is a singularity in the sense that in most cases (when the correlation
has “full rank” in a certain precise sense) full surplus can be extracted in expectation through
appropriate offers of lotteries to the bidders. Despite the elegance of their result, the fact that
bidders may be charged merely for participating in the auction–lottery (including losers) has
been criticized as rendering the auction impractical [20], especially for settings where agents may
easily cancel their participation after the auction is conducted. It is therefore of tantamount
importance to consider the question of designing the optimal ex post individually rational auction
for correlated valuations. This is the question we consider, and in a sense completely answer, in
the current paper.
This past decade saw the advent and rise of Algorithmic Game Theory [24, 22], a research
tradition which can be seen as a complexity-theoretic critique of Mathematical Economics,
with Internet in the backdrop. This point of view has yielded a host of important results and
new insights, for example related to the complexity of equilibria [6, 9], the trade-offs between
complexity, approximation, and incentive-compatibility in social welfare-maximizing mechanism
design [22, 25], and (in an extended sense that includes on-line algorithms as a part of complexity
theory) the price of anarchy [19, 29, 28]. However, there has been little progress in looking at
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Bayesian auctions a`-la Myerson from this point of view. Ronen [26] came up with a mechanism
for the correlated case that achieves half of the optimum revenue, while Ronen and Saberi [27]
showed that no “ascending auction” can do better than 7/8, and they conjectured that all
relevant auctions are ascending (incidentally, we disprove this conjecture by showing that the
optimal two-bidder auction may not be ascending). Missing from these two papers, however, is
a concrete sense of the ways in which this is a difficult problem. We provide this here.
There were several follow-up papers [4, 17, 10], examining the extent to which simple
mechanisms can achieve good approximations of Myerson’s optimal mechanism, and motivated
by Myerson’s astonishing result that the optimal mechanism for the regular i.i.d. setting is
simply a second-price auction with reserve prices. For the most part, these are positive results
yielding constant approximations by simple mechanisms in a variety of settings. Another line of
work is prior-free mechanism design, where the goal is to design mechanisms that achieve profits
comparable to that of some well-behaved benchmark [13]. This direction became especially
interesting after Hartline and Roughgarden developed a framework in [16] that is grounded in
Bayesian optimal mechanism design allowing one to design mechanisms that simultaneously
approximate all Bayesian optimal mechanisms. The intermediate approach of having bidders’
valuations coming from a distribution that is nonetheless unknown to the auctioneer has also
been considered [10]. Finally the important open problem of designing optimal multi-parameter
mechanisms has been addressed for some distributions of preferences, such as additive valuations
with budget constraints [2] and unit-demand settings [5] and connections of this problem to the
algorithmic problem of optimal pricing have been made [4, 14]; economists have also made some
attempts to extend Myerson’s results to multi-item auctions [1, 18].
In this paper we take a complexity-theoretic look at the general, correlated valuations case
of Myerson’s single-item auctions. We point out that the optimal auction design problem can
be reduced essentially to a maximum weighted independent set problem in a particular graph
whose vertices are all possible tuples of valuations (an uncountable set, of course, in the con-
tinuous case). If the distribution is discrete, this is an ordinary graph-theoretic problem; no
such combinatorial characterization had been known, and this had been the main difficulty in
developing an algorithmic and complexity-theoretic understanding of the problem. For discrete
distributions, this leads directly to an efficient algorithm in the case of two bidders, where the
graph is bipartite, while in the case of three or more bidders NP-completeness (in fact, inapprox-
imability) prevails. For continuous distributions, we prove a duality characterization through a
Monge-Kantorovich-like problem [12], and from this a fully polynomial approximation scheme
for two bidders when the distribution is continuous enough and accessible through an oracle —
plus, as an aside, a 2/3 approximation for three bidders, improving the previously best known
approximation of [26].
Our results rest on a geometric characterization of optimal deterministic auctions. An im-
portant element of our proof is the so-called marginal profit contribution function; it bears some
similarities to Myerson’s virtual valuation function [21], the most important of them being that
they both admit a marginal revenue interpretation in the spirit of [3]. However, despite their
similarities and their somewhat common derivation, marginal profit contribution functions are
different from Myerson’s virtual valuations in a number of ways: they only take positive values,
they are not necessarily monotone and they do not admit a natural interpretation as valuations
in some modified domain. One important ingredient of Myerson’s approach to the design of
optimal auctions is an analytical maneuver he calls ironing; Myerson uses ironing to transform
a potentially non-monotone allocation rule into a monotone one, without hurting revenue. Our
approach circumvents ironing by restricting the space of mechanisms explored; we achieve that
by imposing an additional technical condition which limits the design space into a subset of all
mechanisms, but one which still contains all the optimal mechanisms.
The work most related to ours is that of Dobzinski, Fu and Kleinberg [11], who also study the
problem of designing the optimal auction for the correlated setting. They obtain a collection of
very interesting results, which however are quite complementary to ours: Based, among others,
on insights from [26], they arrive at efficient algorithms for computing the optimal randomized
mechanism that is truthful in expectation, and a constant factor approximation of the optimal
deterministic auction for any number of bidders.
2
2 Preliminaries
Imagine n bidders seeking an indivisible good offered in auction. We assume that each bidder
has a private valuation vi for the item and that bidders’ valuations are drawn from some joint
distribution over [0, 1]n whose density function we denote by φ(v). We consider both discrete
and continuous φ. Discrete distributions are the source of the combinatorial insights underlying
our approach, while continuous distributions provide continuity with the spirit and methodology
of Myerson’s paper, another important source of inspiration. In the continuous case, we follow
Myerson in making the analytically convenient assumption that φ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]n.
This is hardly a loss of generality, since a small minimum value on every point can be achieved
by changing φ very little. In stating an algorithm for the two-dimensional continuous case
(Section 5), we shall also assume that φ is Lipschitz-continuous and accessible through an oracle
(in such a way that, for example, it can be approximately integrated over nice regions).
In the discrete case, let Sup(φ) denote the finite support of the joint discrete distribution φ.
Then φ is presented as a finite set of |Sup(φ)| (n+ 1)-tuples of the form (vi1, vi2, . . . , vin, φi), one
for each point vi ∈ Sup(φ), where φi is the probability mass concentrated at the point (vi) of
the support.
We are interested in designing auctions that maximize the auctioneer’s profit. Formally,
an auction consists of an allocation rule denoted by xi(v), the probability of bidder i getting
allocated the item, and a payment rule denoted by pi(v) which is the price paid by bidder i. In
this paper we focus our attention on deterministic mechanisms so that xi(v) ∈ {0, 1}. Our goal
is to maximize the auctioneer’s expected profit
∑n
i=1 E [φ(v)pi(v)].
We want our auction to be ex-post incentive compatible (IC) and individually rational (IR),
with no positive transfers (NPT). These notions are defined as follows:
IC: ∀i, vi, v′i, v−i : vixi(vi, v−i)− pi(vi, v−i) ≥ vixi(v′i, v−i)− pi(v′i, v−i)
IR: ∀i, vi, v−i : vixi(vi, v−i)− pi(vi, v−i) ≥ 0
NPT: ∀i, vi, v−i : pi(vi, v−i) ≥ 0
We say that an allocation function xi(vi, v−i) is monotone if vi ≥ v′i implies xi(vi, v−i) ≥
xi(v
′
i, v−i) for all i, v−i. For the case of deterministic mechanisms that we are interested in
monotonicity implies that xi(vi, v−i) is a step-function. The threshold value of such a step-
function allocation rule is set to be the minimum winning valuation for every player given the
valuations of the other bidders: ti(v−i) = inf{vi ∈ [0, 1] | xi(vi, v−i) = 1}.
The following theorem provides a characterization of mechanisms for the setting we are
interested in; a proof can be found in [23].
Theorem 2.1. A deterministic mechanism satisfies IC, IR and NPT if and only if the following
conditions hold.
1. xi(vi, v−i) is monotone.
2. For all i, vi, v−i we have
pi(vi, v−i) =
{
ti(v−i) if xi(vi, v−i) = 1;
0 if xi(vi, v−i) = 0.
3 The Geometry of Optimal Auctions
Here we focus on the two-bidder case, and provide an alternative geometric interpretation of
the mechanism design problem as a space partitioning problem. Our characterization holds for
any number of bidders, with the appropriate generalizations and modifications; however we only
address the multi-dimensional case in Section 6, where we will use our geometric characterization
to establish the inapproximability of the problem for 3 or more bidders.
We start by noting that the allocation function can be described in terms of a partition
of the unit square (the space of all possible valuation pairs) into three regions: In region A
bidder 1 gets the item, in region B bidder 2 gets the item and in region C neither gets the
item. The shape of those regions is restricted by monotonicity as follows (see Figure 1): Region
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A is rightward closed, meaning that (x, y) ∈ A and x′ > x implies (x′, y) ∈ A, while region
B is, analogously, upward closed. These regions are captured by their boundaries: Region A’s
boundary is a function α : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] where for all y ∈ [0, 1] α(y) = inf{x : (x, y) ∈ A}, and
similarly for region B and its boundary β(x).
Figure 1: A pair of valid allocation rules.
Definition 3.1. A valid allocation pair (α, β) is a pair of functions from [0, 1] to itself
satisfying the non-crossing property: for all points (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 we have y ≥ β(x)⇒ x ≤ α(y).
Notice that it is not necessary for the functions to be monotone; the monotonicity property
of the allocation is ensured through the fact that α and β are proper functions and therefore
regions A and B are rightward and upward closed respectively. The non-crossing property
ensures that for any bid pair (x, y) at most one bidder is allocated the item.
In our proof we will make extensive use of the following notion of marginal profit.
Definition 3.2. Let f (respectively, g) be the marginal profit contribution of a bid pair (x, y)
for player 1 (resp. 2) defined as:
f(x, y) = − ∂
∂x
[
max
x′≥x
x′ ·
∫ 1
x′
φ(t, y) dt
]
, g(x, y) = − ∂
∂y
[
max
y′≥y
y′ ·
∫ 1
y′
φ(x, t) dt
]
wherever the derivative is defined, and is extended to the full range by right continuity.
Intuitively, f(x, y) dx dy is the added expected profit obtained from including the infinitesi-
mal area dx dy to A, that is, deciding to give the item to the first bidder if the valuations are
x, y; in Remark 3.5 we further discuss the intuition behind these functions and their relation to
Myerson’s virtual valuation functions.
Definition 3.3. Call a valid allocation pair proper if it satisfies the following condition:
α(y) ·
∫ 1
α(y)
φ(t, y) dt = max
x′≥α(y)
x′ ·
∫ 1
x′
φ(t, y) dt, for all y
β(x) ·
∫ 1
β(x)
φ(x, t) dt = max
y′≥β(x)
y′ ·
∫ 1
y′
φ(x, t) dt, for all x
 (1)
Marginal profit contribution functions provide us with an alternative way to express the
objective of expected profit.
Lemma 3.4. Let (α, β) be a proper valid allocation pair. Then the expected profit of any auction
with payments defined as in Theorem 2.1 is:∫ 1
0
∫ 1
α(y)
f(x, y) dx dy +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
β(x)
g(x, y) dy dx
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Proof. Let p1(x, y), p2(x, y) be the payment functions induced by the allocation rule (α, β)
according to Theorem 2.1. Then the expected profit of our auction is:
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
p1(x, y)φ(x, y) dx dy +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
p2(x, y)φ(x, y) dx dy
=
∫ 1
0
[
α(y) ·
∫ 1
α(y)
φ(t, y) dt
]
dy +
∫ 1
0
[
β(x) ·
∫ 1
β(x)
φ(x, t) dt
]
dx
=
∫ 1
0
[
max
x′≥α(y)
x′ ·
∫ 1
x′
φ(t, y) dt
]
dy +
∫ 1
0
[
max
y′≥β(x)
y′ ·
∫ 1
y′
φ(x, t) dt
]
dx
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
α(y)
f(x, y) dx dy +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
β(x)
g(x, y) dy dx
where in the first equality we used the characterization of truthful payments as every player’s
critical value, in the second equality we made use of condition (1) and in the last equality we
made use of the definition of marginal profit contribution functions.
Remark 3.5. There is an intuitive connection between the marginal profit contribution and
Myerson’s (ironed) virtual valuations [21]. As pointed out in the introduction, even though these
functions are not identical, the goal in both cases is the same: to capture some notion of marginal
revenue. Indeed the quantity x · ∫ 1
x
φ(t, y) dt corresponds to the expected profit of the auctioneer
from an agent when she is offered a price of x, keeping the value of the other player fixed at
y; equivalently one can write the expected revenue as a function R(q) of the probability of sale
q = 1− ∫ 1
x
φ(t, y) dt (for a thorough discussion of this maneuver the reader is referred to [15]).
Myerson’s virtual valuations then correspond to the derivative of the function R(q), and ironing
corresponds to taking the convex hull Rˆ(q) of R(q) and then differentiating. The “ironing” in
our case corresponds to the action of taking the derivative of R′(q) = maxq′≤q R(q′) instead of
R(q), which is intuitively the “skyline” one would see from q = 0. In Figure 2 we show an
example of a revenue curve R(q) and its corresponding Rˆ(q) and R′(q) curves.
It has been already noted by Myerson [21] that the allocation rule will remain invariant across
ironed regions: in his case this is a consequence of his proof technique involving ironing. In our
case we explicitly demand that the allocation is invariant by imposing Condition 1. Since the
invariance of the allocation rule across ironed regions follows from Myerson’s analysis as well,
Condition 1 is indeed not a loss of generality in the sense that all optimal auctions satisfy it.
We prove this formally next.
The next lemma establishes that without loss of generality we can restrict ourselves to proper
allocation pairs. Let Profit(α, β, φ) denote the profit of an auction with allocation curves (α, β),
when the joint distribution of valuations is φ.
Lemma 3.6. For any φ and for any valid allocation pair (α, β) there is a proper valid pair
(α′, β′) such that Profit(α′, β′, φ) ≥ Profit(α, β, φ)
Proof. For the sake of contradiction suppose this is not true, i.e. Profit(α′, β′, φ) < Profit(α, β, φ)
for any proper valid allocation pair (α′, β′).
We start by defining the following sets of points:
Y =
{
y ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ α(y) ·
∫ 1
α(y)
φ(t, y) dt 6= max
x′≥α(y)
x′ ·
∫ 1
x′
φ(t, y) dt
}
X =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ β(x) ·
∫ 1
β(x)
φ(x, t) dt 6= max
y′≥β(x)
y′ ·
∫ 1
y′
φ(x, t) dt
}
as the set of all coordinates y (resp. x) where condition (1) is violated by function α (resp. β).
Consider now the auction defined by the following allocation curves:
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α′(y) =
{
α(y) , if y /∈ Y;
arg maxx′{x′
∫ 1
x′ φ(t, y) dt | x′ ≥ α(y)} , if y ∈ Y.
β′(x) =
{
β(x) , if x /∈ X ;
arg maxy′{y′
∫ 1
y′ φ(x, t) dt | y′ ≥ β(x)} , if x ∈ X .
where –in the case of ties– arg{·} returns the largest y or x respectively. By construction, the
new pair (α′, β′) satisfies condition (1). In what follows we claim that the resulting allocation
pair (α′, β′) is also valid and moreover it has greater revenue than (α, β), thus reaching a
contradiction.
The monotonicity property of the allocation is satisfied since α′ and β′ are proper functions
of y and x respectively. The non-crossing property follows from the non-crossing property of α
and β and the fact that α′(y) ≥ α(y) for all y ∈ [0, 1] and β′(x) ≥ β(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Finally,
for the profit of the two auctions defined by the allocation curves (α, β) and (α′, β′) we have:
Profit(α′, β′, φ)
=
∫ 1
0
[
α′(y) ·
∫ 1
α′(y)
φ(t, y) dt
]
dy +
∫ 1
0
[
β′(x) ·
∫ 1
β′(x)
φ(x, t) dt
]
dx
≥
∫ 1
0
[
α(y) ·
∫ 1
α(y)
φ(t, y) dt
]
dy +
∫ 1
0
[
β(x) ·
∫ 1
β(x)
φ(x, t) dt
]
dx
= Profit(α, β, φ),
where the inequality follows from the definition of α′ and β′. The lemma now follows.
Denote now by AB the set of all proper valid allocations (α, β). The problem of finding the
optimal auction can now be restated as the following variational calculus-type problem:
Definition 3.7. [Problem A]
sup(α,β)∈AB
{∫ 1
0
∫ 1
α(y)
f(x, y) dx dy +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
β(x)
g(x, y) dy dx
}
Figure 2: The revenue curves R, Rˆ and R′.
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4 Two Bidders: The Discrete Case
In this section we present an algorithm for computing the optimal mechanism when there are
two bidders with a discrete joint distribution φ with support Sup(φ) = [N ]× [N ].
The marginal profit contribution functions defined in the previous section can be appropri-
ately modified for the discrete setting in hand:
Definition 4.1. The discrete analogues of the marginal profit contribution functions (Definition
3.2) for each player are defined as follows:
f(i, j) = max
i ·∑
i′≥i
φ(i′, j)−
∑
i′>i
f(i′, j), 0
 for player 1
g(i, j) = max
j ·∑
j′≥j
φ(i, j′)−
∑
j′>j
g(i, j′), 0
 for player 2
As in the continuous case, we will represent the auction through a pair of functions (α, β):
Definition 4.2. A valid allocation pair (α, β) for the discrete setting is a pair of functions
from [N ] to itself satisfying the non-crossing property: for all points (i, j) ∈ [N ]× [N ] we have
j ≥ β(i) ⇒ i < α(j). Such a pair partitions the set Sup(φ) into three sets A,B, and C, where
A = {(i, j) ∈ Sup(φ) : i ≥ α(j)}, B = {(i, j) ∈ Sup(φ) : j ≥ β(i)}, and C = Sup(φ) − A − B.
We say that (α, β) induces the partition (A,B), where C is implicit.
Suppose that for a valid pair (α, β) representing an optimal auction and j ∈ [n], we have
that f(α(j), j) = 0. Then the auction represented by the same valid pair, except that α(j) is
increased by one, is also an optimal auction (since it entails the same set of positive marginal
profit contributions). We can therefore consider, without loss of generality, only valid pairs with
f(α(j), j), g(i, β(i)) > 0. We call such valid pairs proper. Finally, we define Π(φ) to be the set
of all partitions A,B of Sup(φ) induced by proper valid pairs.
Now, looking back at the formulation of the optimum-revenue auction problem in Problem
A at the conclusion of the last section, it is immediate that obtaining the optimum-revenue
auction in the discrete case is tantamount to solving a discrete optimization problem:
max
(A,B)∈Π(φ)
∑
(i,j)∈A
f(i, j) +
∑
(i,j)∈B
g(i, j).
All that remains now is to provide a useful characterization of the set Π(φ). To this end,
notice first that any such pair of sets (A,B) has the following two additional properties, the
first one inherited from incentive compatibility, and the second one following from the fact that
the allocation curves form a proper valid pair:
Definition 4.3. We call a pair of disjoint subsets (A,B) of Sup(φ) monotone if the following
holds:
• If (i, j) ∈ A and (i′, j) ∈ Sup(φ) with i′ > i, then (i′, j) ∈ A.
• If (i, j) ∈ B and (i, j′) ∈ Sup(φ) with j′ > j, then (i, j′) ∈ B.
We call such a pair proper if
• If (i, j) ∈ A and (i′, j) /∈ A for all i′ < i, then f(i, j) > 0.
• If (i, j) ∈ B and (i, j′) /∈ B for all j′ < j, then g(i, j) > 0. That is, in proper partitions, all
lower boundary points of the regions A and B have positive marginal profit contributions
(the intuition being that otherwise, either this is not an optimal auction in the case of a
negative marginal contribution, or there is another optimal auction with this property in
the case of a zero marginal contribution).
Let us define now a bipartite graph Gφ = (U,W,E):
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• U = {ui,j | i, j ∈ [N ]} and W = {wi,j | i, j ∈ [N ]};
• (ui,j , wi′,j′) ∈ E if and only if i ≤ i′ and j ≥ j′. In other words, there is an edge between
u and w if and only if, informally, (i′, j′) “lies to the southeast” of (i, j) (see Figure 3);
(Notice that, in our informal sense, a point “lies to the southeast” of all points to its north
and to its west, including the point itself.)
• The weight of any node ui,j is f(i, j) and the weight of any node wi,j is g(i, j).
Intuitively, the bipartite graph captures impossibilities in constructing the optimal auction:
an edge (u,w) signifies that it is not possible that both u ∈ A and w ∈ B (slightly abusing
notation).
Figure 3: The bipartite graph for 2 players with N = 2.
We can now prove the sought combinatorial characterization of Π(φ):
Lemma 4.4. Let (A,B) be a pair of disjoint subsets of Sup(φ). Then (A,B) ∈ Π(φ) if and only
if (A,B) is monotone and proper, and {ui,j : (i, j) ∈ A} ∪ {wi,j : (i, j) ∈ B} is an independent
set of Gφ.
Proof. (If.) Since {ui,j : (i, j) ∈ A} ∪ {wi,j : (i, j) ∈ B} is an independent set of Gφ it follows
that the sets A and B are disjoint. Now, since (A,B) is a pair of monotone, proper and disjoint
subsets of Sup(φ) the following pair of functions (α(j), β(i)) is a proper valid pair, immediately
implying that (A,B) ∈ Π(φ): α(j) = min{i | (i, j) ∈ A} and β(i) = min{j | (i, j) ∈ B}.
(Only if.) If (A,B) ∈ Π(φ) then by the definition of Π(φ) the sets (A,B) have to be
monotone and proper and they also need to form a partition, i.e. be disjoint. To show that
{ui,j : (i, j) ∈ A} ∪ {wi,j : (i, j) ∈ B} is an independent set of Gφ assume towards contradiction
that there are nodes ui,j and wi′,j′ such that (i, j) ∈ A and (i′, j′) ∈ B, with an edge between
ui,j and wi′,j′ ; from the construction of G
φ, it follows that i ≤ i′ and j ≥ j′. Since A and B are
both monotone, it follows that (i′, j) ∈ A ∩B, contradicting the disjointness of A and B.
The next Lemma shows that the additional assumptions that (A,B) is a proper and mono-
tone pair of subsets are not necessary, if one restricts attention to the optimal solution (i.e. the
solution of maximum weight).
Lemma 4.5. Let (A,B) be a pair of subsets of Sup(φ) such that the set {ui,j : (i, j) ∈ A}∪{wi,j :
(i, j) ∈ B} is a maximum weight independent set of Gφ, of minimum cardinality among all
independent sets of the same weight. Then (A,B) is monotone and proper, i.e. (A,B) ∈ Π(φ).
Proof. It suffices to show that the set (A,B) is monotone and proper, and the lemma follows
from Lemma 4.4. Indeed, the monotonicity of (A,B) follows from the fact that the set {ui,j :
(i, j) ∈ A} ∪ {wi,j : (i, j) ∈ B} is a maximum weight independent set, and all weights are non-
negative. Moreover, since the independent set has minimum cardinality among all independent
sets of the same weight, it follows that it does not contain any node ui,j of zero weight, i.e.
corresponding to some valuation (i, j) such that f(i, j) = 0, unless it also includes a node ui′,j
corresponding to some valuation (i′, j) with f(i′, j) > 0 for some i′ < i (and analogously for
wi,j). Hence, by definition, (A,B) is proper as well.
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Theorem 4.6. Given a discrete joint valuation distribution φ for two bidders, the optimal
ex-post IC and IR deterministic auction can be computed in time O(|Sup(φ)|3).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 4.5 that computing the optimal auction for two bidders with a
joint valuation distribution φ reduces to computing a maximum weight independent set on the
induced bipartite graph Gφ. In particular the optimal allocation rule corresponds to a partition
(A,B) such that {ui,j : (i, j) ∈ A} ∪ {wi,j : (i, j) ∈ B} is a maximum weight independent
set of Gφ, with minimum cardinality among all independent sets of the same weight. Finding
the maximum weight independent set by running a min-cost-flow algorithm yields the desired
running time.
5 Two Bidders: The General Case
In this section we return to the continuous two-bidder problem of Section 3. Our main result is
an efficient algorithm that approximates the optimum solution of Problem A within an additive
. Our main tool is a duality theorem, generalizing the duality between the maximum-weight
independent set problem in a bipartite graph and a minimum-cost flow in an associate network.
In particular, we show that the maximization Problem A defined in Section 3 is equivalent to a
certain mass-moving minimization problem (reminiscent in some aspects of the classic Monge-
Kantorovich [12] mass-transfer problem), namely the following:
Definition 5.1. [Problem B]
infγ
{∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 dx1 dy1
}
s.t.
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 ≥ f(x1, y1), ∀(x1, y1) ∈ [0, 1]2∫ 1
y2
∫ x2
0
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx1 dy1 ≥ g(x2, y2), ∀(x2, y2) ∈ [0, 1]2
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) ≥ 0, ∀(x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ [0, 1]2
Let us denote by Γ the set of all functions γ : [0, 1]4 7→ < satisfying the above constraints.
One intuitive interpretation of Problem B is this: We are given two landscapes in the unit
square, captured by two functions f, g : [0, 1]2 7→ <. We are seeking a plan for transforming
landscape f to landscape g, where the following operations are allowed:
• take material away from any point (x, y);
• add material to any point (x, y);
• transfer material from any point to any other point in the southeast direction (if some
material is not moved, we think of it as having moved in the southeast direction zero
distance).
We want the plan in which the total amount of material moved (irrespective of distance moved,
here is where this problem differs significantly from Monge-Kantorovich) is minimized. We next
show that this problem coincides, at optimality, with the optimal auction:
Theorem 5.2. [Duality Theorem]
For any joint density function φ on [0, 1]2:
sup
(α,β)∈AB
{∫ 1
0
∫ 1
α(y)
f(x, y) dx dy +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
β(x)
g(x, y) dy dx
}
= inf
γ∈Γ
{∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 dx1 dy1
}
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5.1 Proof of the Duality Theorem
General Plan. The proof of the theorem is by discretizing the unit square into domains of
small size, proving a duality result for the discrete version, establishing upper bounds for the
discretization error, and taking the limit for finer and finer discretization. In the course of the
proof we will introduce a number of auxiliary problems.
Discretization. We start by discretizing the continuous functions f and g defined on [0, 1]×
[0, 1] by two discrete functions fd and gd defined on the [n] × [n] grid, where n is an integer
greater than one and [n]={0,1,. . . ,n-1}; we denote 1n by . We subdivide the [0, 1]× [0, 1] square
into ×  little squares; we are mapping a little square with southwest coordinate (x, y) to the
grid point n · (x, y). The discrete functions are now obtained by assigning to each point in the
grid the aggregate mass of its corresponding square on the plane.
fd(i, j) =
∫ (i+1)
i
∫ (j+1)
j
f(x, y) dy dx, for i, j = 0, . . . , n− 1
and
gd(i, j) =
∫ (i+1)
i
∫ (j+1)
j
g(x, y) dy dx for i, j = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Figure 4: The graph consisting of two grids, one for each player, for n = 3.
The Graph. We next create a weighted bipartite graph G = (U, V,E) as follows: U = V =
[n]× [n]. We use u(i, j) and v(i, j) to denote the vertices of U and V respectively, and sometimes
use the shorthand u and v to refer to nodes of each grid respectively. Vertex u(i, j) of U has
a weight equal to wu = fd(i, j), and similarly vertex v(i
′, j′) of V has a weight wv = gd(i′, j′).
A pair (u(i, j), v(i′, j′)) is in E if and only if i < i′ and j > j′, that is, if grid point v is in the
(strictly) Southeast direction from grid point u (see Figure 4 for an example with n = 3).
Consider now the following problem, familiar from the previous section:
Definition 5.3. [Problem C: Maximum Weight Independent Set]
Given the weighted bipartite graph G = (U, V,E) above,
max{xu∈{0,1},xv∈{0,1}}
∑
u∈U,v∈V
xuwu + xvwv
s.t. xu + xv ≤ 1, ∀(u, v) ∈ E
The dual of the above problem is the following:
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Definition 5.4. [Problem D: Minimum Cost Transshipment]
Given the weighted bipartite graph G = (U, V,E) above,
min{yuv∈<}
∑
(u,v)∈E
yuv
s.t.
∑
v:(u,v)∈E
yuv ≥ wu, ∀u ∈ U
∑
u:(u,v)∈E
yuv ≥ wv, ∀v ∈ V
yuv ≥ 0, ∀(u, v) ∈ E
The Inequalities. The crux of the proof is a sequence of results relating the various solutions
and optimum solutions of these four problems. In what follows we use SOL(·) to denote the
cost of any feasible solution of a problem among (A), (B), (C), and (D) defined above, and
OPT (·) to denote the cost of the optimum solution of a problem (sometimes SOL and OPT
also denotes the actual solutions). The first such inequality establishes a form of weak duality
between Problems A and B, while the next two show that the discretization error is small.
Lemma 5.5. For any feasible solutions of A and B we have: SOL(A) ≤ SOL(B).
Proof.
SOL(A)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
α(y1)
f(x1, y1) dx1 dy1 +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
β(x2)
g(x2, y2) dy2 dx2
≤
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
α(y1)
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 dx1 dy1 +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
β(x2)
∫ 1
y2
∫ x2
0
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx1 dy1 dy2 dx2
where we used the inequality constraints of Problem B to upper bound the values of f(x, y) and
g(x, y). We next notice that:∫ 1
0
∫ 1
β(x2)
∫ 1
y2
∫ x2
0
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx1 dy1 dy2 dx2 ≤
∫ 1
0
∫ α(y1)
0
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 dx1 dy1
This inequality follows from the non-negativity of γ and the fact that the (x1, y1, x2, y2) included
in the integral of the LHS are the following set:
{(x1, y1, x2, y2) ∈ [0, 1]4 | y2 ≥ β(x2), x1 ≤ x2, y1 ≥ y2}
= {(x1, y1, x2, y2) ∈ [0, 1]4 | y2 ≥ β(x2), x1 ≤ x2, y1 ≥ y2, x1 ≤ α(y1)}
⊆ {(x1, y1, x2, y2) ∈ [0, 1]4 | x2 ≤ α(y2), x1 ≤ x2, y1 ≥ y2, x1 ≤ α(y1)}
⊆ {(x1, y1, x2, y2) ∈ [0, 1]4 | x1 ≤ x2, y1 ≥ y2, x1 ≤ α(y1)}
which is exactly the set of (x1, y1, x2, y2) included in the integral of the RHS. The first equality
above follows from the fact that the inequality x1 ≤ α(y1) follows from the inequalities {y2 ≥
β(x2), x1 ≤ x2, y1 ≥ y2}, because we have y1 ≥ β(x2) so the non-crossing property implies
that x2 ≤ α(y1) and therefore x1 ≤ α(y1). The first set inclusion follows from the fact that
y2 ≥ β(x2)⇒ x2 ≤ α(y2) from the non-crossing property, while the last inclusion is trivial.
We have therefore concluded that the cost of any feasible solution of A is upper bounded by:∫ 1
0
∫ 1
α(y1)
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 dx1 dy1 +
∫ 1
0
∫ α(y1)
0
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 dx1 dy1
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 dx1 dy1
= SOL(B)
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Lemma 5.6. For the optimal solutions of A and C we have: OPT (A) ≥ OPT (C)− .
Proof. Consider the optimal solution of Problem C; we will use it to come up with a feasible
solution for Problem A such that SOL(A) ≥ OPT (C)− . We start with the following solution:
we allocate the item to player 1 for all valuations (x, y) such that xu(b x c,b y c) = 1; we allocate
to player 2 for all valuations (x, y) such that xv(b x c,b y c) = 1, and xu(b x c,b y c) = 0; and finally,
we allocate to nobody for all valuations (x, y) such that xu(b x c,b y c) = 0 and xv(b x c,b y c) = 0.
We next show that the resulting allocation regions have the shape of Figure 5, meaning
that the borders of those regions consist a valid allocation pair. First notice that for any pair
of valuations (x, y) –including those for which xu(b x c,b y c) = 1 and xv(b x c,b y c) = 1– only one
player gets allocated the item, so the non-crossing property is satisfied. To see why the regions
are rightward and upward closed consider two nodes u(i, j) and u(i′, j) on player 1’s grid, where
i′ > i. Notice that the set of nodes on player 2’s grid that node u(i, j) of player 1’s grid is
connected to, is a strict superset of the nodes that node u(i′, j) is connected to. Hence, if the
maximum weight independent set includes node u(i, j) on the grid of player 1, it should also
include u(i′, j) for all values i′ > i.
This gives us two stairwise curves which –although being a valid allocation pair– may fail
to satisfy Condition 1, and hence may not be a feasible solution for Problem A. To turn them
into a proper valid pair, we can follow the same procedure as the one in the proof of Lemma 3.6
and come up with a feasible solution SOL(A) for Problem A.
Because of the aforementioned transformation the cost of this solution is greater or equal to
the cost of the optimal solution OPT (C) minus the contribution to the weight of the independent
set by those nodes v(i, j) for which the corresponding node u(i, j) on the grid of player 1 is also
included in the independent set. The reason for that is that for valuations (x, y) such that
xv(b x c,b y c) = 1 and xu(b x c,b y c) = 1, our solution explicitly allocates the item only to player 1,
therefore losing the weight contribution of node v(
⌊
x

⌋
,
⌊
y

⌋
). In what follows we argue that this
results in the loss of an -additive factor, so that the cost of the resulting solution is at least:∑
u∈U
xufd(u) +
∑
v∈V
xvgd(v)−  = OPT (C)− 
To show this we first argue that the number of nodes v(i, j) for which this happens is small, in
particular there can only be at most 1/ such nodes. To see this notice that in the constructed
feasible solution to Problem A, these nodes lie on the boundary between regions where player
1 gets the item and player 2 gets the item; any such boundary has to be monotone, since it
corresponds to the overlap of the two allocation curves α, β, and it can therefore contain at
most 1/ nodes. Next notice that the value of g at any point (x, y) is at most 1: indeed,
g(x, y) is defined as yφ(x, y) − ∫ 1
y
φ(x, t)dt, wherever ∂∂y
[
maxy′≥y y′ ·
∫ 1
y′ φ(x, t) dt
]
is defined,
and extended to full range by right continuity. It follows immediately that g(x, y) ≤ 1 and
wv(i,j) = gd(i, j) ≤ 2; therefore the total weight loss is at most 1 · 2 and the lemma follows.
Lemma 5.7. For the optimal solutions of B and D we have: OPT (D) ≥ OPT (B).
Proof. Given a feasible solution for Problem D, we will come up with a feasible solution of the
same cost for Problem B. The optimum solution for Problem B will have at most that cost and
the lemma follows.
We start by defining γ(x1, y1, x2, y2), for any pair of points (x1, y1), (x2, y2) where the 
2-area
square containing (x2, y2) lies in the (strict) southeast orthant of the 
2-area square containing
(x1, y1), as follows:
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) = f(x1, y1) · g(x2, y2) · yuv
wuwv
, if
⌊x1

⌋
<
⌊x2

⌋
and
⌊y1

⌋
>
⌊y2

⌋
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Figure 5: The solution for Problem A prior to the transformation of Lemma 3.6.
where u ∈ U (resp. v ∈ V ) is the grid point u (⌊x1 ⌋ , ⌊y1 ⌋) (resp. v (⌊x2 ⌋ , ⌊y2 ⌋)) that
corresponds to the little 2-area square containing point (x1, y1) (resp. (x2, y2)). Finally, we let:
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) = 0, if
⌊x1

⌋
≥
⌊x2

⌋
or
⌊y1

⌋
≤
⌊y2

⌋
We next verify that the function γ defined above satisfies the constraints of Problem B.
Since the non-negativity constraint is obviously satisfied, we only need to check that γ satisfies
the first and second constraints of Problem B. We only provide the proof for the first constraint
and the proof for the second constraint follows along the exact same lines:
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2
=
∑
i>b x1 c,j<b y1 c
∫ (i+1)
i
∫ (j+1)
j
f(x1, y1) · g(x2, y2) ·
yu(b x1 c,b y1 c),v(b x2 c,b y2 c)
wu(b x1 c,b y1 c) · wv(b x2 c,b y2 c)
dy2 dx2
= f(x1, y1) ·
∑
i>b x1 c,j<b y1 c
yu(b x1 c,b y1 c),v(i,j)
wu(b x1 c,b y1 c) · wv(i,j)
·
∫ (i+1)
i
∫ (j+1)
j
g(x2, y2) dy2 dx2
= f(x1, y1) ·
∑
i>b x1 c,j<b y1 c
yu(b x1 c,b y1 c),v(i,j)
wu(b x1 c,b y1 c) · wv(i,j)
· wv(i,j)
= f(x1, y1) ·
∑
i>b x1 c,j<b y1 c
yu(b x1 c,b y1 c),v(i,j)
wu(b x1 c,b y1 c)
≥ f(x1, y1)
where in the first equality we split the integration over discretized square regions of area 2 (the
same that are used in the discrete auxiliary Problems C and D) and in the second equality we
rearranged the order of summation and integration, noticing that the weights w and flows y
remain constant across the discretized squares (independently of the actual value of (x2, y2)).
In the third equality we used the definition of the weight w and in the last inequality we used
the fact that y is a feasible solution for Problem D and therefore
∑
v∈E yuv ≥ wu.
We conclude our proof by showing that the cost of the feasible solution we produced is
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exactly OPT (D):∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 dx1 dy1
=
∑
i,j
∫ (i+1)
i
∫ (j+1)
j
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2 dx1 dy1
=
∑
i,j
∫ (i+1)
i
∫ (j+1)
j
f(x1, y1) ·
∑
i′>b x1 c,j′<b y1 c
yu(b x1 c,b y1 c),v(i′,j′)
wu(b x1 c,b y1 c)
dx1 dy1
=
∑
i,j
∑
i′>i,j′<j
yu(i,j),v(i′,j′)
wu(i,j)
·
∫ (i+1)
i
∫ (j+1)
j
f(x1, y1) dx1 dy1
=
∑
i,j
∑
i′>i,j′<j
yu(i,j),v(i′,j′)
wu(i,j)
· wu(i,j)
=
∑
i,j
∑
i′>i,j′<j
yu(i,j),v(i′,j′)
= OPT (D)
where in the first equality we split the integration of (x1, y1) over discretized square regions of
area 2 and in the second equality we plugged in the expression for
∫ y1
0
∫ 1
x1
γ(x1, y1, x2, y2) dx2 dy2
that we had derived from our previous proof establishing that the first constraint of Problem B
was satisfied. In the third equality we once again rearranged the order of summation and inte-
gration, noticing that the weights w and flows y remain constant across the discretized squares
(independently of the actual value of (x1, y1)), in the fourth equality we used the definition of
the weight w and in the last equality we replaced with the objective function of Problem D.
Proof of the Duality Theorem. First notice that, by strong duality and since the constraint
matrix of Problem C is totally unimodular, we have that OPT (C) = OPT (D); combining
this with Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7 we get OPT (A) ≥ OPT (B) − . From Lemma 5.5 we get
OPT (A) ≤ OPT (B). By having → 0 we get the result.
5.2 The Algorithm
The proof of the Main Theorem suggests a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FP-
TAS) for the continuous case, that is, a mechanism that approximates the optimal profit within
additive error , and runs in time polynomial in 1 . In the algorithm and the correctness proof,
we assume that the continuous joint distribution φ is Lipschitz continuous, and that it is pre-
sented through oracle access. It is easy to see that these assumptions are essentially necessary,
in that no approximation (or meaningful solution of any other nature) is possible when the
function can be arbitrarily discontinuous, or is inaccessible for large parts of the domain.
Algorithm 1 OptimalAuction for two bidders with continuous distributions
1: Input: probability distribution φ ∈ [0, 1]2
2: Compute f(·, ·), g(·, ·)
3: Discretize the unit plane and construct the bipartite graph G as described in Section 5.1
4: Compute a Maximum Weight Independent Set for G
5: Output: (α, β), the valid allocation pair corresponding to the stair-like curves of Figure 5
The following theorem establishes that our algorithm has the desired properties.
Theorem 5.8. Algorithm 1 returns a truthful mechanism that approximates the optimal profit
within  additive error; moreover the algorithm runs in time polynomial in 1/.
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Proof. Algorithm 1 returns a valid allocation pair so it is truthful by construction. However
the allocation pair (α, β) returned may well not satisfy condition (1) and may consequently not
constitute a feasible solution to Problem A. This is problematic since it does not allow us to
use Lemma 3.4 to compute the profit of the auction returned. To that end we need to establish
that the violation of condition (1) is –in some sense– negligible; we do that next.
Suppose that curve α(y) violates condition (1) for some y∗ ∈ [0, 1] and let
x∗ = arg max
x≥α(y∗)
x ·
∫ 1
x
φ(t, y∗) dt,
be the minimum x for which we could create a new solution α′ by setting α′(y∗) = x∗ and have
condition (1) restored, while not altering the profit of our auction.1 We will argue that
α(y∗) ·
∫ 1
α(y∗)
φ(t, y∗) dt ≥ x∗ ·
∫ 1
x∗
φ(t, y∗) dt−Θ() (2)
To do that we consider the node corresponding to the little square on the unit plane containing
(α(y∗), y∗). Since this node belongs to the boundary of the allocation region of player 1, we
can assume wlog that it has non-zero weight; hence there must exist some point (x1, y1) in
the corresponding square on the unit plane with f(x1, y1) > 0. By the definition of f this
immediately implies that
x1 ·
∫ 1
x1
φ(t, y1) dt ≥ x ·
∫ 1
x
φ(t, y1) dt, for all x ≥ x1
and therefore in particular that
x1 ·
∫ 1
x1
φ(t, y1) dt ≥ x∗ ·
∫ 1
x∗
φ(t, y1) dt. (3)
Since the l1-distance of points (α(y
∗), y∗) and (x1, y1) and of points (x∗, y∗) and (x∗, y1) is at
most 2, we get that:
α(y∗)·
∫ 1
α(y∗)
φ(t, y∗) dt ≥ x1·
∫ 1
α(x1)
φ(t, y1) dt−2λ ≥ x∗·
∫ 1
x∗
φ(t, y1) dt−2λ ≥ x∗·
∫ 1
x∗
φ(t, y∗) dt−4λ
where in the first and third inequalities we used the fact that x · ∫ 1
x
φ(t, y) dt is Lipschitz-
continuous for some constant λ and in the second inequality we used inequality (3). The exact
same argument applies for β(x) as well.
We are now ready to prove a lower bound on the profit of the auction returned by our
algorithm; in what follows we use α′(y) and β′(x) to denote the allocation curves that would
result by the aforementioned transformation. Note that by construction it holds that
α′(y) ·
∫ 1
α′(y)
φ(x, y) dx =
∫ 1
α′(y)
f(x, y) dx and β′(x) ·
∫ 1
β′(x)
φ(x, y) dy =
∫ 1
β′(x)
g(x, y) dy (4)
so the profit of the algorithm is:∫ 1
0
[
α(y) ·
∫ 1
α(y)
φ(x, y) dx
]
dy +
∫ 1
0
[
β(x) ·
∫ 1
β(x)
φ(x, y) dy
]
dx
≥
∫ 1
0
[
α′(y) ·
∫ 1
α′(y)
φ(x, y) dx−Θ()
]
dy +
∫ 1
0
[
β′(x) ·
∫ 1
β′(x)
φ(x, y) dy −Θ()
]
dx
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
α′(y)
f(x, y) dx dy +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
β′(x)
g(x, y) dy dx−Θ()
= OPT (C)−Θ()
≥ OPT (A)−Θ()
1The reader is referred to Lemma 3.6 for further discussion on this point.
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where in the first inequality we used inequality (2), in the first equality we used (4) and in the
last inequality we used our Main Theorem from the previous section.
In terms of running time, the discretized approximations of f and g are trivial (because of
Lipschitz continuity, we can take f(i, j) = f(i, j), and similarly for g). Solving the Maximum
Weight Independent Set problem is done exactly as in the previous section.
6 NP-completeness
We show that for 3 bidders the problem of designing an approximately optimal (deterministic)
auction becomes NP-hard. The current proof establishes hardness for a small threshold around
0.05%; we believe that this will not be too hard to improve upon.
6.1 A geometric characterization for three bidders
We start by formally defining the discrete version of the problem we will prove to be NP-hard; to
simplify the exposition of the problem, we assume that the support of the discrete distribution
is G = [S]× [S]× [S]. We are interested in this problem:
Definition 6.1 (3OptimalAuctionDesign). Given a joint discrete probability distribution
φ supported on G, find the optimal, ex-post IC and IR deterministic auction, denoted by a 3-
dimensional allocation matrix A, where A[x, y, z] = i, with i being the index of the bidder who
gets the item when the bid vector is (x, y, z), or 0 if the auctioneer keeps the item.
As was the case with 2 bidders, the following notion of marginal profit contribution, appro-
priately modified for the discrete case, will be useful to our proof.
Definition 6.2. The discrete analogues of the marginal profit contribution functions (Definition
3.2) for each player are the following:
f(x, y, z) = max
x ·∑
x′≥x
φ(x′, y, z)−
∑
x′>x
f(x′, y, z), 0
 for player 1
g(x, y, z) = max
y ·∑
y′≥y
φ(x, y′, z)−
∑
y′>y
f(x, y′, z), 0
 for player 2
h(x, y, z) = max
z ·∑
z′≥z
φ(x, y, z′)−
∑
z′>z
f(x, y, z′), 0
 for player 3
The Segments. Given a distribution φ(x, y, z) over the points of G, any node (x, y, z) of G
with f(x, y, z) > 0 is the starting point of what we shall henceforth be calling an x-segment :
an interval (sequence of points) starting at node (x, y, z) and including all nodes (x′, y, z) with
x′ ≥ x. The weight of this segment is ∑x′≥x f(x′, y, z). We define segments across the other
dimensions analogously. The following problem2 is essentially equivalent to the auction design
problem:
Definition 6.3 (3Segments). Given a joint discrete probability distribution φ supported on
G, which induces a set of segments on G as described above, find a subset of non-intersecting
segments with maximum sum of weights.
Lemma 6.4. The problem 3Segments(φ) is equivalent to 3OptimalAuctionDesign(φ) via
approximation-preserving reductions.
2The reader may notice that the 3Segments problem is a maximum weight independent set problem in disguise.
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Proof. (Sketch:) The correspondence between solutions of the two problems is rather immediate,
with the x-segment (respectively, y-segment, z-segment) at point (x, y, z) included in the output
set of segments if and only if A[x, y, z] = 1 (respectively, 2, 3) and A[x′, y, z] = 0 for all x′ < x
(respectively, A[x, y′, z] = 0 for all y′ < y and A[x, y, z′] = 0 for all z′ < z).
6.2 The construction
It suffices to show that 3Segments is NP-hard to approximate for some constant; we do that
by reducing from 3CatSat, a special case of 3Sat:
Definition 6.5. Let 3CatSat be the 3Sat problem with the input formula restricted to be of
the following form. We have three types (categories) of variables {xi}i=1...nx , {yi}i=1...ny and
{zi}i=1...nz , i.e. a total of n = nx + ny + nz variables, and m clauses of the following form:
every clause has at most one literal from every type (e.g. (x¯2 ∨ y¯3 ∨ z1) or (x¯5 ∨ z7)).
Lemma 6.6. 3CatSat is NP-hard to approximate better than 79/80.
Proof. We reduce from Max3Sat. In order to turn an instance of Max3Sat to an instance
of 3CatSat it suffices to create three copies for every occurrence of a variable: for variable x
we create x1, x2, x3 and include the clauses (x1 ∨ x2), (x2 ∨ x3), (x3 ∨ x1). This increases the
number of clauses by at most 3n¯, where n¯ is the number of literals in the formula. Given that
Max3Sat is hard to approximate better than 7/8, it follows immediately that 3CatSat is hard
to approximate better than 7/8m+3n¯m+3n¯ . Noticing that n¯ ≤ 3m we get the desired approximation
factor as an upper bound on this expression by picking n¯ = 3m.
We start with some intuition about the reduction. The instance of 3Segments we create
has three types of segments: literal segments, clause segments and scaffolding segments.
• Literal segments are used to model truth assignments on variables; they ensure that every
variable is assigned exactly one of the two possible truth values and that this assignment
is consistent across all appearances of literals of this particular variable.
• Clause segments model the truth assignment to literals of a particular clause; we create one
such clause segment for every literal that appears in a clause and we make them intersect
with the literal segments of those literals; the idea is that if the clause is satisfied we will
be able to pick at least one clause segment per clause because the corresponding literal
segment will not be picked. Moreover, we cannot pick two or more clause segments per
clause, since they will all intersect with each other.
• Scaffolding segments3 ensure that, for some points, there are literal or clause segments
that extend only to one of the three possible directions: In particular, given some point
(x, y, z) with positive marginal profit contribution for more than one players (for example
when f(x, y, z) > 0 and g(x, y, z) > 0) we may want to have only x or only y-segments
starting from (x, y, z); scaffolding points make sure this is the case.
We show how to construct a probability distribution φ that serves as the input of 3Segments,
given an instance of 3CatSat. In what follows we use nˆ to denote max{nx, ny, nz}. The
support4 of φ is: {h(i)|i = 1, . . . , nˆ+ 2m+ 4}3, for an appropriate choice of the values h(i)
which we will fix later; for now all we assume is that h is an increasing function of i. The size
of the support is at most (nˆ+ 2m+ 4)3, so this is clearly a polynomial time construction.
We shall abuse notation and write φ(x, y, z) instead of φ (h(x), h(y), h(z)) when there is no
ambiguity. We shall also refer to the sub-matrices φ(i, ·, ·), φ(·, j, ·), φ(·, ·, k) as the “planes”
x = i, y = j and z = k respectively.
The construction goes as follows: we start with an all-zero matrix φ of the above size.
Consider an arbitrary ordering of the clauses 1 through m. Suppose the l-th clause is of the form
(xi ∨ yj ∨ zk) where xi, yj and zk can be either positive or negative literals, and i (resp. j, k) =
3Rather, scaffolding points, as these segments have zero length.
4The support is actually a subset of this; these are all the points (values of the players) with potentially non-zero
probabilities. This will become clear in the actual construction.
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1, . . . , nx (resp. ny, nz) (the same construction also works for clauses with less than 3 variables).
For this clause we introduce the following literal segments (1,2,3) and clause segments (4). In
what follows we will first set the probability mass of the point that is the apex of each segment,
and will later show how to use scaffolding-points to ensure that there is only one segment starting
at each such point, towards the appropriate direction.
1. If pos(xi) then φ (i+ 1, nˆ+ 2, nˆ+ 2 + l) = c1 and φ (i+ 1, nˆ+ 2 +m+ l, nˆ+ 2) = c1
(These points are intended to be the apices of a y-segment and a z-segment respectively.)
else φ (i+ 1, nˆ+ 2 + l, nˆ+ 2) = c1 and φ (i+ 1, nˆ+ 2, nˆ+ 2 +m+ l) = c1
(These points are intended to be the apices of a z-segment and a y-segment respectively.)
2. If pos(yj) then φ (nˆ+ 2 + l, j + 1, nˆ+ 2) = c1 and φ (nˆ+ 2, j + 1, nˆ+ 2 +m+ l) = c1,
(These points are intended to be the apices of a z-segment and an x-segment respectively.)
else φ (nˆ+ 2, j + 1, nˆ+ 2 + l) = c1 and φ (nˆ+ 2 +m+ l, j + 1, nˆ+ 2) = c1
(These points are intended to be the apices of an x-segment and a z-segment respectively.)
3. If pos(zk) then φ (nˆ+ 2, nˆ+ 2 + l, k + 1) = c1 and φ (nˆ+ 2 +m+ l, nˆ+ 2, k + 1) = c1,
(These points are intended to be the apices of an x-segment and a y-segment respectively.)
else φ (nˆ+ 2 + l, nˆ+ 2, k + 1) = c1 and φ (nˆ+ 2, nˆ+ 2 +m+ l, k + 1) = c1
(These points are intended to be the apices of a y-segment and an x-segment respectively.)
4. φ (1, nˆ+ 2 + l, nˆ+ 2 + l) = φ (nˆ+ 2 + l, 1, nˆ+ 2 + l) = φ (nˆ+ 2 + l, nˆ+ 2 + l, 1) = c2
(These points are intended to be the apices of an x-segment, a y-segment and a z-segment
respectively.)
Every positive occurrence of a variable of type, say, x results in the following two seg-
ments: a positive literal segment starting at (i+ 1, nˆ+ 2, nˆ+ 2 + l) that intersects with the
corresponding clause segment starting at (1, nˆ+ 2 + l, nˆ+ 2 + l), and a literal segment start-
ing at (i+ 1, nˆ+ 2 +m+ l, nˆ+ 2) that does not intersect with any clause segment; this is also
called a dummy-negative literal segment. Negative occurrences of variables analogously result in
negative and dummy-positive literal segments. Dummy literal segments are introduced because
–for reasons that will become apparent later– we want to ensure that we have an equal number
of positive and negative literal segments (when dummies are included).
The reduction relies on the fact that the only intersections involving literal and clause
segments will be between literal segments of literals that are negations of each other, between
clause segments of the same clause and between clause segments and their corresponding literal
segments. To ensure that we need the aforementioned scaffolding segments; these will ensure
that the only segments starting from the points defined above as having probability masses c1
and c2 (henceforth called c1 and c2 points), are the desired literal and clause segments (in other
words we want those c1 and c2 points to be the apices of only the segments mentioned above):
1. We first ensure that there is exactly one segment starting from every point c2, which is
perpendicular to the plane x,(or y, z ) = 1; in other words we ensure that there are no other
segments starting at c2 that lie on the plane, by introducing: φ (1, nˆ+ l + 2, nˆ+ 2m+ 3) =
φ (1, nˆ+ 2m+ 3, nˆ+ l + 2) = φ (nˆ+ l + 2, 1, nˆ+ 2m+ 3) = φ (nˆ+ 2m+ 3, 1, nˆ+ l + 2) =
φ (nˆ+ l + 2, nˆ+ 2m+ 3, 1) = φ (nˆ+ 2m+ 3, nˆ+ l + 2, 1) = c3, for all l = 1, . . . ,m, with
the requirement that:
h(nˆ+ l + 2) · (c2 + c3) < h(nˆ+ 2m+ 3) · c3, ∀l = 1, . . . ,m
The above requirement forces the corresponding marginal profit contribution function to
be negative at any c2 point, for some appropriately chosen player-direction: For exam-
ple, we want point (1, nˆ+ 2 + l, nˆ+ 2 + l) to be the apex of an x-segment only, and
no y or z-segment should start at this point. We achieve this by including the points
φ (1, nˆ+ l + 2, nˆ+ 2m+ 3) = φ (1, nˆ+ 2m+ 3, nˆ+ l + 2) = c3; the above inequality then
ensures that
g (1, nˆ+ 2 + l, nˆ+ 2 + l) = h (1, nˆ+ 2 + l, nˆ+ 2 + l) = 0
and therefore there are no y or z-segments starting at this point.
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2. We next ensure that there are no segments starting from c1 that go along row or col-
umn nˆ + 2, by introducing: φ (i+ 1, nˆ+ 2, nˆ+ 2m+ 3) = φ (i+ 1, nˆ+ 2m+ 3, nˆ+ 2) =
φ (nˆ+ 2, j + 1, nˆ+ 2m+ 3) = φ (nˆ+ 2m+ 3, j + 1, nˆ+ 2) = φ (nˆ+ 2, nˆ+ 2m+ 3, k + 1) =
φ (nˆ+ 2m+ 3, nˆ+ 2, k + 1) = c4, for i = 1, . . . , nx, j = 1, . . . , ny, k = 1, . . . , nz, with the
requirement that:
h(nˆ+ l + 2) · (2mc1 + c4) < h(nˆ+ 2m+ 3) · c4, ∀l = 1, . . . , 2m
because we can have at most m occurrences of any variable, and hence at most 2m c1-
entries on any given level. The rationale behind the inequality above is the same as in case
(1) above.
3. Finally, we ensure that there are no segments starting from a point c1 on plane x = i (resp.
y = i, z = i), for i = nˆ+3, . . . , nˆ+2m+2, perpendicular to the plane x (resp. y, z), by in-
troducing: φ (nˆ+ 2m+ 4, i, nˆ+ 2) = φ (nˆ+ 2m+ 4, nˆ+ 2, i) = φ (nˆ+ 2, nˆ+ 2m+ 4, i) =
φ (i, nˆ+ 2m+ 4, nˆ+ 2) = φ (i, nˆ+ 2, nˆ+ 2m+ 4) = φ (nˆ+ 2, i, nˆ+ 2m+ 4) = c5, for all
i = nˆ+ 3, . . . , nˆ+ 2m+ 2, with the requirement (along the same lines as above) that:
nˆ · h(nˆ+ 1) · c1 < h(nˆ+ 2m+ 4) · c5
The following values for h(·) and the constants5 satisfy all of the constraints above:
h(i) =
 1 +
i−1
nˆ+2m+1 for i = 1, . . . , nˆ+ 2m+ 2
4 for i = nˆ+ 2m+ 3
5 for i = nˆ+ 2m+ 4
and
c1 =
1
nˆ2m
, c2 = 1, c3 = 1, c4 =
3
nˆ2
, c5 =
2
5nˆm
Our main result for this section is then the following:
Lemma 6.7. It is NP-hard to approximate 3Segments better than 0.05%.
Proof. We first note that regardless of the instance of 3CatSat we are reducing from, we can
always obtain a fixed profit for 3Segments from the scaffolding points; by picking the most
profitable segments starting at each of the scaffolding points we get a total profit of:
F = 6m · h(nˆ+ 2m+ 3)c3 + 2n · h(nˆ+ 2m+ 3)c4 + 12m · h(nˆ+ 2m+ 4)c5
Let n¯ be the total number of literal occurrences in the formula. We then have the following:
• If the 3CatSat formula is satisfiable then the profit of 3Segments is exactly:
m · h(1)c2 + n¯ · h(nˆ+ 2)c1 + F (5)
To see this first consider the following way to pick the literal segments according to the
truth values assigned to the corresponding variables: if a variable is set to true6 we include
its negative literal segments (and the corresponding dummy-positive literal segments).
Notice that –thanks to the dummy literal segments– there is an equal number of positive
and negative literal segments (dummies included), with totally 2n¯ of them; we include
exactly half of them for every variable (either the positive or the negative ones), so the
total profit from these segments is exactly n¯ · h(nˆ+ 2)c1.
Moreover, since the formula is satisfiable, at least one literal per clause is satisfied; if
this is a positive6 literal, then the variable has been set to true so the literal segments
for this variable included in our 3Segments solution will be the negative ones. However
since the variable appears as a positive literal at this clause, our construction ensures that
the corresponding clause segment intersects only with the positive literal segment of this
5In order to have a proper probability distribution these constants need to be normalized by their sum.
6The other case is completely symmetrical.
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variable. Therefore, since the clause segment does not intersect with the negative literal
segment (that we have already included in our 3Segments solution), we can include the
clause segment in our solution as well. Each one of these clause segments contributes
h(1)c2; noticing that we cannot include more than one clause segment from each clause
(because they intersect) we get that their total contribution is exactly m · h(1)c2.
• If the optimal assignment for 3CatSat satisfies at most ρ of the clauses, then the optimal
profit for 3Segments is at most:
ρm · h(1)c2 + n¯ · h(nˆ+ 2)c1 + F (6)
To prove this we show how to transform a solution of profit ≥ ρm · h(1)c2 + n¯ · h(nˆ +
2)c1 + F to a truth assignment that satisfies more than ρ of the clauses. First notice
that in order to achieve such a profit we must include exactly n¯ literal segments and
exactly one clause segment per clause for ρ of the clauses: we cannot include more without
having intersecting segments and we cannot include any less and achieve the same profit.
These n¯ literal segments correspond to a truth value assignment to the variables of the
formula as described above: we set every variable whose positive (resp. negative) literal
segments are included to false (resp. true). The claim follows by noticing that this truth
value assignment satisfies every clause for which a clause segment was included in the
3Segments solution, i.e. for a fraction ρ of the clauses.
From the way we set the constants and h(·), it follows that expression (5) is≥ 25m and expression
(6) is ≤ (24 + ρ)m+ δ for some constant δ  0.1, for sufficiently large m and n. Using the fact
from Lemma 6.6 that ρ = 79/80 we get an approximation ratio of 1999/2000.
Figure 6: The xy-plane for z = k+1, k = 1, . . . , nz, contains the literal segments of variable
zk. By [·] we mean that this point does not appear at all levels z. Every such level must
have an equal number of c1-entries in line nˆ + 1 and column nˆ + 1; also notice that it is
not possible to simultaneously have non-zero entries both for row and column i at the same
level z.
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Figure 7: The xy-plane for z = 1. The exact position of every c2 depends on the clause
in which the variable appears: every time a variable zk appears in clause l, we introduce
two literal segments lying on level z = k + 1, through c1-points, and a clause segment
perpendicular to this plane, through a c2-point, so that it intersects with the non-dummy
literal segment.
Figure 8: The xy-plane for z = nˆ+ 2m+ 4.
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Figure 9: The construction in three dimensions. The red lines depict literal segments and
the green lines clause segments as they are positioned in the space.
Combining Lemmas 6.4 and 6.7 immediately yields our main theorem for this section:
Theorem 6.8. It is NP-hard to approximate 3OptimalAuctionDesign better than 0.05%.
7 Discussion and Open Problems
Even though in this paper we focused on deterministic mechanisms, our geometric characteriza-
tion has interesting consequences for randomized mechanisms. Remember that for the discrete
case the optimal (deterministic) mechanism immediately follows from solving the integer pro-
gram of Problem C in Section 5.1, i.e. computing a maximum weight independent set in the
corresponding n-partite graph. Our first observation is that the linear programming relaxation
of this integer program corresponds to computing the optimal randomized mechanism. For two
players, where the graph is bipartite and the integer program is totally unimodular, the optimum
integer solution is also the optimum of the relaxed linear program. Therefore, for two bidders,
the program of Problem C computes a deterministic mechanism that is optimal among all ran-
domized mechanisms: this is reminiscent of Myerson’s original result, where the deterministic
mechanism obtained is optimal for the (larger) class of Bayesian truthful randomized mecha-
nisms [21]. For a constant number of three or more bidders, the generalization of our geometric
characterization yields polynomial-time algorithms for computing the optimal randomized auc-
tion, in sharp contrast with the intractability of computing the optimal deterministic auction,
even for three bidders; of course for a large number of bidders, the size of this linear program
may become exponentially large and therefore this approach is infeasible. For an alternative
linear program that computes the optimal randomized auction for any number of bidders, when
the distribution is given explicitly, the reader is referred to [11].
An important open problem of this work is to close the gap between the best approximation
algorithm known for the optimal auction problem (currently .60) [11] and the inapproximability
bound (currently about .9995). We believe that progress there is attainable. Interestingly, our
work implies an approximation of 2/n for n players: before having the bidders announce their
bids, the auctioneer looks at their joint distribution and privately runs the optimal auction for
all possible pairs of players. Since solving for the optimal auction is nothing but a maximum
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weight independent set problem on the corresponding graph, it is easy to prove that the profit
of the best of those
(
n
2
)
auctions is at least 2/n of the overall profit. The auctioneer then rejects
a priori all but the bidders who were part of the most profitable two-bidder auction and then
runs it. The overall auction is obviously truthful as long as bidders are rejected before even
submitting their bids. For 3 bidders this gives an approximation ratio of 2/3, improving over
Ronen’s auction [26], but for n ≥ 4 the approximation ratio drops below 1/2.
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